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Abstract
In recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on earmarks, 
the quintessential example of pork barrel politics. We assess the degree 
to which existing theories can explain the distribution of earmarks in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. First, drawing on informal interviews 
with individuals on Capitol Hill regarding the earmark process, we argue 
that assessing institutional and constituency-level factors that affect the 
earmark receipts of individual members requires examination at the level 
of the Appropriations subcommittees. Second, we demonstrate that both 
distributive and partisan theories of legislative organization are applicable 
to the distribution of earmarks. Finally, we present results indicating 
that contrary to the conventional wisdom, most subcommittees do not 
distribute pork based on electoral vulnerability. Rather, legislators’ status 
in the appropriations process has the most influence. These findings offer 
insights into the path forward as debate continues over congressionally 
directed spending.
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Despite a recent lull in what had been a steady rise in the use of congressional 
earmarks, much remains to be learned about how the U.S. Congress distrib-
utes these funds. A long-standing literature in political science links pork, as 
a broadly defined legislative commodity, to the electoral interests of mem-
bers of Congress (Stein & Bickers, 1995). Moreover, recent scholarship 
argues that earmarks are a tool the majority party leadership employs to 
benefit its most vulnerable members (Lazarus, 2009). However, research 
generally treats the underlying mechanics in an amorphous way—rarely is 
the process precisely specified, and theoretical treatments and empirical 
analyses often gloss over important procedural aspects of congressional 
budgeting.
In this article, we use data from the appropriations bills for fiscal years 
2008 and 2009 to demonstrate that the earmark process cannot be explained 
by just one theoretical perspective on legislative organization. First, we argue 
that committees led by “cardinals” and ranking members, as opposed to party 
leaders, dominate the distribution of earmarks, thus underscoring a commit-
tee-centric theory of legislative organization. However, this does not mean 
that parties are an unimportant part of the story—our data reveal that the 
majority party receives 60% of earmark dollars compared with only 40% 
reserved for the minority. Furthermore, we find little support for the argu-
ment that a disproportionate share of earmarks is provided to members in 
marginal districts. Yet we do find evidence supporting a simple distributive 
politics theory of universalistic lawmaking, because almost all representa-
tives receive some earmark dollars.
In building our case, we advance understanding of the congressional pork 
barrel by wading into the structural mechanisms of earmark distribution in 
the U.S. House of Representatives to demonstrate the nuanced factors shap-
ing who wins and who loses. Unlike prior studies that have typically focused 
on a specific category of earmarks or lumped all earmarks into an aggregate 
sum, we incorporate the fact that nearly all earmarks are added at the sub-
committee level and test hypotheses using a research design that more closely 
mirrors the data-generating process (Morton, 1999). We contend that com-
mittee and subcommittee leaders not only benefit disproportionately in the 
earmark game, but that they are also the key players who determine how well 
their colleagues will fare. Our findings hearken back to a more integrated 
view of legislative politics in which “competing” theories all contribute to 
conceptualizing and explaining distributive outcomes.
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The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the relevant theories of 
legislative organization and develop expectations regarding the distribution 
of earmarks. In the next sections, we briefly review the extant literature on 
pork and discuss our perspective on resource allocation, which begins to fill 
a long-standing gap by probing the micro-level institutional dynamics that 
characterize the distribution of earmarks. The succeeding sections describe 
our data and present the empirical results, and we conclude with a discussion 
of the implications of our findings and some avenues for future research.
Legislative Organization and Pork Barrel Politics
For many years, scholars approached studies of the appropriations process 
from one of two broad perspectives—the distributive theory of legislative 
organization that explains outlays based on the electoral interests of individ-
ual members and partisan theories that posit a major role for the majority 
party in structuring legislative outcomes. More recently, research has begun 
to link these perspectives by finding commonalities among them.
Distributive and Partisan Politics
Briefly, distributive (or gains-from-exchange) theories were developed by 
Weingast (1979), Ferejohn (1986), Shepsle and Weingast (1987), and others, 
all of whom posit that the internal operations of Congress are designed to 
promote the distribution of policy benefits to electorally important constitu-
encies. These theories describe a committee system that exists to facilitate 
logrolling across issue dimensions and to help solve the collective action 
problems inherent in a legislative body composed of members who want to 
vote with their districts to get reelected (Arnold, 1990; Mayhew, 1974). 
Furthermore, in an important addition to distributive theories, Weingast and 
Marshall (1988) argue that, because committees have gate-keeping power 
over their specific policy area and members have control over their commit-
tee seats due to the (no longer sacrosanct) seniority rule, logrolling will be 
institutionally supported. We believe that much of the earmark process fol-
lows this model, where committees are strong and power is dispersed among 
the chairs and ranking members.
Building on the distributive politics theories, Shepsle and Weingast (1981) 
develop a formal model to explain the universalism inherent in distributive 
politics that results from members’ uncertainty over who will be part of future 
winning coalitions. Their model seeks to resolve the minimal winning coali-
tion arguments made by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1962), as 
well as the empirical reality of universalism in various issue areas (Ferejohn, 
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1974; Froman, 1967; Maass, 1951; Manley, 1970; Mayhew, 1974; Weingast, 
1994). Our findings will shed light on this account of distributive politics as 
well, as we find that nearly all members who look to participate in the ear-
mark process receive at least some of the pie.
We should note that a starting point of many of the distributive theories is 
that committees are often stacked with high demanders who accrue a greater 
than proportionate share of the “output” from the relevant committee. It is 
possible that this extra yield is primarily a function of the high demand for 
distributive goods on the part of the members on the committee rather than a 
result of the committee posts themselves. However, in the case of the 
Appropriations Committee, it is highly likely that many potential high 
demanders do not receive a slot on the committee. This is supported by 
Edwards and Stewart (2006) who use committee transfers to show that a seat 
on the Appropriations Committee is consistently among the mostly highly 
sought assignments in the House. Furthermore, the distributive theories also 
point out that high demanders are able to keep the larger share of earmarks 
due to institutional constraints inherent in the committee structure and House 
rules. This implies there is still something to be gained from the position 
itself.
In contrast to distributive theories of lawmaking stand Cox and 
McCubbins’s (1993, 2005) cartel model and the conditional party govern-
ment (CPG) theory of Rohde (1991) and Aldrich and Rohde (1998, 2000a, 
2001), which posit a partisan theory of lawmaking in the U.S. House.1 
Partisan models have been applied directly to the appropriations process as 
well (Aldrich & Rohde, 2000b; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1985, 1991). Cartel 
theory tells us that the key to legislative success in Congress lies in control-
ling the agenda. Majority parties act as procedural cartels by exercising nega-
tive agenda control to ensure that no legislation will reach the floor that 
would split the party or move the status quo unfavorably with respect to a 
majority of its members. To make certain that such legislation does not 
receive a floor vote, rank-and-file members are expected to support the party 
on procedural votes (such as special rules votes in the House) in exchange for 
the possibility of securing a more powerful position in the institution and 
increasing the probability of maintaining (or achieving) majority status. 
Proponents of CPG argue that party strength is conditional on the homogene-
ity within each party and the heterogeneity between the two parties. When 
these two conditions are realized, rank-and-file members cede power to the 
leadership to enable them to “encourage” members to act in ways that further 
the party’s goals. One way to stay in favor with the leadership is to vote with 
the party when needed on important legislation. If sending money to districts 
improves the chances of winning reelection—as posited by Mayhew 
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(1974)—and hence remaining in the majority, then parties will have reason to 
make sure the bulk of these resources go to their members’ districts.
Theoretical Linkages, Subcommittee Context, and Expectations
Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman (2002) straddle the partisan and 
distributive literatures and find that the likelihood of receiving a pork barrel 
project is distributed evenly between the majority and minority parties in the 
House, although the majority enjoys an advantage in the dollar amount of 
earmarks accrued. Thus, the majority is insulated from blame for fiscal irre-
sponsibility while maintaining an advantage in sending more home to their 
constituents than the minority. These findings, based on educational ear-
marks, help to reconcile the universalistic theories of distributive politics dis-
cussed previously with other majoritarian theories of lawmaking (Carsey & 
Rundquist, 1999; Lee, 2000; Lee & Oppenheimer, 1999; Levitt & Snyder, 
1995).
Recent work on pork barrel politics has incorporated insights from both 
partisan and distributive models as well as broadened theorizing to include 
other considerations such as geography, the implications of bicameral varia-
tion in electoral cycles, and cross-chamber differences among various types 
of pork (Clemens, Crespin, & Finocchiaro, 2013, 2015; Crespin & 
Finocchiaro, 2013; Evans, 2004; Frisch, 1998; Lee, 2003; Shepsle, Van 
Houweling, Abrams, & Hanson, 2009). The growing literature on earmarks 
has, for various reasons, typically examined just a single type of earmark 
(e.g., Balla et al.’s, 2002, analysis of academic earmarks and Lee’s, 2003, 
study of projects included in the 1998 transportation authorization bill) or 
pooled all earmarks irrespective of the appropriations bill in which the proj-
ect was included (e.g., Engstrom & Vanberg, 2010; Lazarus, 2009, 2010; 
Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009; Shepsle et al., 2009). The primary interest of 
these research endeavors was to uncover broad partisan and/or electoral 
dynamics affecting the allocation of earmarks. And the resulting findings 
underscore the fact that the majority party often is advantaged, at least condi-
tionally, in the distribution of pork. One of the key contingencies of the con-
ditional findings involves electoral circumstance, as scholars have found that 
members facing a more challenging electoral environment are more focused 
on obtaining pork (Stein & Bickers, 1995) and often receive a greater amount 
of pork than their more entrenched colleagues (Lazarus, 2009). According to 
Bickers and Stein (1996), this additional pork reduces the odds that a vulner-
able incumbent will face a quality challenger in their next election. However, 
only some voters pay attention to pork awards, thus attenuating the useful-
ness of pork for reelection (Stein & Bickers, 1994). It is also worth noting 
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that Democrats tend to benefit more from traditional earmarks whereas 
Republicans are rewarded for other types of federal spending (Alvarez & 
Saving, 1997; Crespin & Finocchiaro, 2013; Lazarus & Reilly, 2010; Sellers, 
1997).
Although the research cited above has rather exhaustively explored the 
aggregate patterns of pork distribution, the underlying mechanics of the dis-
tributional process have been treated in a rather nebulous fashion. That is to 
say, the empirical patterns reveal that funds are channeled to specific mem-
bers, but the question of who is responsible for the division has been left 
largely unspecified. For instance, Lazarus (2009) advances the argument that 
“majority party leaders are able to protect the projects going to their party’s 
vulnerable members” (p. 1050). Similarly, Crespin and Finocchiaro (2008) 
provide evidence that majority party senators receive a disproportionate 
share of earmarks relative to the minority, whereas Shepsle et al. (2009) dem-
onstrate a cyclical effect in appropriations earmarks corresponding with the 
staggered nature of Senate elections. To date, however, a clear exposition of 
who is responsible for the allocation decisions that we observe has been lack-
ing. Therefore, we believe it is critically important to open this black box by 
highlighting some important aspects of the appropriations process in the 
House and, thereby, offering a more precise theoretical account of earmark-
ing in Congress.
We begin with the observation that the universe of earmarks is not the 
most appropriate starting point for study. Rather, as Fenno (1966) observed, 
“the tasks of the Appropriations Committee are accomplished by its subcom-
mittees” (p. 134). Although the committee may no longer stand as the guard-
ian of the treasury, subcommittee autonomy in regard to earmarks remains 
the norm for House Appropriations, and subcommittees often have their own 
unique cultures and standard operating procedures. The 12 subcommittee 
chairs of each chamber, known as the cardinals because of their significant 
presence in the system, exert tremendous influence over the appropriations 
process, as do their ranking minority counterparts (Savage, 1991). The inde-
pendence of the subcommittees also produces a level of influence for rank-
and-file members of the subcommittee (Fenno, 1966).
These aspects of subcommittee politics were reinforced in interviews we 
conducted with legislative staff. Describing earmark practices, one House 
staffer told us that each subcommittee
is its own entity and operates as such. They often require different information 
when making a request (i.e., some require a line item budget for the project 
[while] others do not) and they all have some variation in procedures for 
submitting a request (some require paper and electronic submissions while 
others are all electronic).2
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The staffer went on to say that
what’s important is the understanding and agreement between the ranking 
member and the [subcommittee] chair. And in general, that understanding 
includes the reality that ranking members control minority projects and chairs 
control majority projects. In fact, as a staffer, I assume this as fact.3
We also spoke with a former staffer for the majority leadership in the 
111th Congress (2009-2010). He said, in addition, that “[then-Chairman] 
Obey, for the most part, stays out of the specific programs, decisions, etc., of 
the subcommittees” and that it is the cardinals who “manage the bills on the 
floor”—to such an extent that “subcommittees would sometimes provide 
their own vote recommendations on the floor.”4 All of this underscores the 
independence of the House Appropriations subcommittees, as well as their 
leaders (including ranking members), in steering the flow of earmarks to the 
rank and the file.
Although some studies have accounted for the fact that cardinals should 
do better (see, for example, Lazarus, 2010), the linkage is rarely, if ever, made 
to the specific subcommittee of interest.5 Our argument is that, if subcommit-
tees are the locus of decision making, then it is subcommittee chairs and their 
minority party counterparts (the ranking members) as well as, to a somewhat 
lesser extent, ordinary subcommittee members who should secure the most 
pork. One might think of this as the supply side of pork, because the subcom-
mittee members—and particularly the cardinals and ranking members—are 
the ones who control the flow of pork.
We can draw multiple inferences about the earmarking process from the 
competing theories of legislative organization and previous research, as well as 
our theoretical perspective regarding the importance of subcommittee politics. 
Of course, the expectations, just like the theories, are not mutually exclusive 
(Hurwitz, Moiles, & Rohde, 2001). However, we can determine whether the 
weight of the evidence points one way or the other. The distributive politics 
model predicts a committee-dominated process where committee members 
receive a greater share of the earmarks while not completely excluding non-
members from the distribution. Similarly, we can draw several predictions 
from the partisan model. And finally, our theoretical understanding of the sub-
committee process leads to a specific approach to examining their influence.
More specifically, distributive theories of legislative politics suggest the 
following hypotheses governing the distribution of pork in the House:
Hypothesis 1: Institutional considerations such as committee/subcommit-
tee membership and leadership status will significantly drive the amount 
of pork received.
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Evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 will show that the most basic assump-
tions of the distributive theories are correct. That is, committees can guard 
their legislative outputs from unraveling on the floor.
Hypothesis 2: Nearly all members should receive at least some pork from 
some subcommittees, reflecting the prevalence of logrolling and the stra-
tegic importance of cultivating varied alliances.
Evidence in support of Hypothesis 2 will provide support for the more 
universalistic derivatives of the distributive theories best captured by Shepsle 
and Weingast (1981).
By contrast, partisan theories of legislative politics suggest that individual 
members and their characteristics are less central determinants. Instead, pork 
awards should be targeted so as to help the majority retain its control of the 
chamber. To wit
Hypothesis 3: A member of the majority party of the House will receive 
more pork on average, representing part of an overall strategy to re-elect 
their members and thereby retain majority status.
Hypothesis 4: A member of the majority party who occupies a marginal 
district will be granted more pork to protect the majority party’s control of 
the chamber.
Evidence in support of Hypotheses 3 and 4 will provide support for the 
idea that parties can bias outcomes toward the majority party median and use 
the legislative process to make their members better off. These last two 
hypotheses assume that representatives equate more pork with increased 
chances of electoral success. In the next section of the article, we discuss in 
greater detail some of the empirical regularities of the subcommittee process, 
and then turn to a discussion of our data. The analysis that follows will 
explore these questions both descriptively and with the use of regression 
analyses.
Data and Research Design
As our expert interviews revealed in detail, the process of compiling the 
package of earmarks to be included in appropriations legislation occurs well 
before a bill reaches the floor of the House or Senate; in addition, important 
differences exist across the Appropriations subcommittees in the amount of 
pork distributed and the factors driving distribution (Crespin & Finocchiaro, 
2008; Shepsle et al., 2009). Thus, the picture of earmarks that emerges in the 
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aggregate—for instance, 10,160 projects totaling US$19.6 billion in 2009—
masks a tremendous amount of underlying variation among the 12 House and 
12 Senate Appropriations subcommittees and the bills that they assemble.6 
The production of the 12 appropriation bills is actually a complicated milieu 
of requests accumulated from members for specific projects in their states 
and districts, interactions with and among full and subcommittee staff and 
members, and eventual legislative vehicles that sometimes stand on their own 
while at other times end up being rolled into an omnibus measure (Crespin, 
Finocchiaro, & Wanless, 2009).
Given the centrality of subcommittee-level decision making, our empiri-
cal approach examines pork allocation at the subcommittee level separately 
by party and also incorporates the direct effect of a member’s status as a 
cardinal on that subcommittee. We adopt this disaggregated approach because 
it is our belief that it more clearly follows the data-generating process and to 
ignore it would omit important nuance in this aspect of distributive politics. 
If staff directly involved with the process believe this is how the system oper-
ates, we should at least initialize our study of it with this in mind. For this 
reason, we will drill down below the full committee and test our hypotheses 
about earmark allotments at subcommittee level.
The data analyzed in this study comprise earmarks fiscal years 2008-2009. 
The main dependent variable measures the earmarked dollars obtained by 
each legislator as reflected in the final conference reports for 10 of the 12 
appropriations bills for both fiscal years.7 The 110th House was the first to be 
subject to rules requiring committee disclosure of the legislator requesting 
each earmark, thereby allowing us to more directly assess the degree to which 
individual members of Congress succeeded in obtaining earmarks.8 One 
drawback to the limited timeframe for our data analysis is the absence of 
variation in majority party control. As such, we need to be cautious in not 
generalizing beyond our period of study. To handle earmarks that were 
requested by more than one member of Congress, we divided the dollar 
amount of each earmark by the number of legislators that requested it and 
allocated that proportion of the earmark to each legislator. Ultimately we 
generated 11 variables at the member level: one for each of the 10 
Appropriations subcommittees indicating the amount of earmark money 
received, and an additional variable indicating the total amount of pork 
received by each representative across the pool of subcommittees. In our 
regressions, we use the natural logarithm of these dollar figures for our 
dependent variable due to the rightward skew of the distribution.9
At this juncture, a few words are in order with respect to our decisions to 
(a) analyze earmarks and (b) employ dollar values as opposed to project 
counts. An attractive feature of earmarks as a measure of “pork” is that they 
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are relatively narrow in their definition and are under the purview of mem-
bers of Congress to a much greater extent than, for instance, the sorts of 
programs identified by the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), 
which has been the vehicle for analysis in much of the research on distribu-
tive politics (see, for example, Berry, Burden, & Howell, 2010; Stein & 
Bickers, 1995). In addition, earmarks are less susceptible to the analytical 
problems associated with endogeneity that are posed by other measures (such 
as FAADS), because efforts to obtain earmarks are limited to a short window 
of time and members are capped in terms of what a legislator can hope to 
obtain.10 Thus, it is not likely the case that added effort on the part of vulner-
able members will produce significantly more earmarks—as such, concerns 
about a causal arrow that runs in both directions between earmarks and vul-
nerability are minimized. On the second point, we choose to employ a depen-
dent variable based on the dollar value of earmarks as opposed to the number 
of projects for a few reasons. First, using a raw count limits our ability to 
distinguish among drastically variant awards because it treats a US$100,000 
earmark the same as a US$1,000,000 earmark. Second, because the number 
of earmarks that members may request is limited, a count is censored in a way 
that the dollar value of earmarks is not. Finally, our theory is more concerned 
with how much members receive in comparison with whether they receive 
something at all.
To construct our independent variables, we used the Congressional 
Directory for the 110th Congress to identify the chair and ranking member of 
each subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and to identify 
every representative who served on the Appropriations Committee.11 
Dichotomous variables in our dataset indicate whether the member was a 
cardinal or ranking member of the full Appropriations Committee, a cardinal 
or ranking member of a subcommittee, a member of the Appropriations 
Committee (or subcommittee where appropriate), and a member of the major-
ity Democratic Party. Prior research has suggested that party leaders might 
also be expected to reap some rewards from their privileged institutional 
position, as well as seniority in the institution (see, for example, Lazarus, 
2009). As such, we control for both of these with variables that code for lead-
ership (Speaker and Majority Leader for the Democrats and Minority Leader 
and Minority Whip for the Republicans) and seniority, defined as the number 
of terms served as reported by CQ’s Politics in America (Angle & Koszczuk, 
2007). Finally, we included a variable identifying whether a member’s prior 
election was competitive. We ultimately settled on a dichotomous variable 
(Marginal District) coded one if the member received less than 60% of the 
vote in the previous election.12 We believe that a dichotomous as opposed to 
a continuous variable is preferable because the traditional measure of 
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competitiveness using previous vote share assumes a consistent linear effect 
from the most competitive to the least competitive district. Once members 
earn at least 60% of the vote, it is reasonable to assume that they are no longer 
vulnerable.13
In addition to the preceding variables that correspond to the factors of 
interest from the theoretical arguments presented earlier, we also account for 
district demand. As Frisch and Kelly (2011) note, earmarks are frequently 
responses to local conditions. Many members encourage constituents or 
organizations to request earmarks through a routinized process that includes 
filling out a form that is often posted on the member’s webpage. In this view, 
legislators channel district demands as they determine which requests to pur-
sue formally in the earmark process. A story in the Washington Post is illus-
trative. Alaska Rep. Don Young “has equated earmarks with serving his 
constituents, telling his local paper that as long as constituents ‘continue to 
request federal funding for their projects of interest, then I will continue to do 
my best to accommodate them’” (Leonnig, 2010).14 Finally, because our data 
span two fiscal years, we include a dichotomous variable for 2008 to account 
for any temporal effect.
With this in mind, our examination of earmarks at the subcommittee level 
directly accounts for district demand following Adler’s (2002) committee-
by-committee specification of district characteristics, which we have 
extended through the 2000s wave of redistricting. Because Adler’s data 
extend only through the 1990s redistricting, we updated most of the measures 
to the 2007-2008 districts and mapped the old jurisdictions to the new ones 
(jurisdictions were shifted, and subcommittees renamed, multiple times in 
the 2000s). Appendix A of the Supporting Information (https://thedata.har-
vard.edu/dvn/dv/finocchi) presents a brief overview of the variables that we 
were able to reconstruct and their linkage to the various subcommittees. 
These measures were then used to create a “demand” variable for each sub-
committee. To create the subcommittee measures of demand, we again fol-
lowed Adler, standardizing each of the individual component measures (i.e., 
each component was rescaled to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one) and then summing across each of the individual measures. The “total” 
demand variable for the initial results presented below is the summation of 
each of the subcommittee variables.
Results
In the tables and figures below, we provide some descriptive statistics for our 
data. We then turn to a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results 
demonstrating that although there are some similarities across subcommittees, 
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there are important differences as well. In addition, our goal is to consider 
which of the theories of legislative organization are most clearly borne out in 
the data.
Figure 1 provides an accounting of earmarks for 10 of the 12 House spend-
ing bills. Consistent with previous research (Crespin et al., 2009), there is 
substantial variation across subcommittees. In total, these bills contained just 
less than US$16 billion worth of earmarks. Similar to previous years, the 
Defense bill contained the most pork—more than US$6 billion total, which 
represented roughly 40% of all earmarks for the two fiscal years. The Energy 
and Water, Military Construction, and Transportation bills were the next larg-
est tier, with more than 10% of earmark dollars each. The other six bills 
together contained just less than a quarter of the total.
Figure 2 plots the distribution in the number of Appropriations subcom-
mittees from which members received earmarks. Although the modal number 
of subcommittees is 7 (of the 10 we consider in our analysis), in just more 
than 50 cases from the two fiscal years analyzed, members received no ear-
marks.15 At the other extreme, in 31 instances members received earmarks 
from every subcommittee. This variation underscores the importance of con-
sidering subcommittee-level differences in the factors driving the earmark 
$0 $200,000 $400,000 $600,000
Transportation
Military Construction
Labor-HHS-Ed.
Interior
Homeland Security
Financial
Energy and Water
Defense
Com-Just-State
Agriculture
Total in $10,000s.
Figure 1. Total earmark dollars by subcommittee.
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process in the House. It also provides initial support for Hypothesis 2 in light 
of the fact that most members receive at least some earmarks.
In Figure 3, we show the percent of earmark dollars for each subcommit-
tee that went to members serving on the full House Appropriations Committee 
and the relevant subcommittees. If the chairs and ranking members of the 
Appropriations subcommittees distributed earmarks in an equal fashion, we 
would expect each House member to receive 1/435th of the total earmark 
dollars. This would translate to about 15% of earmarks going to the 66 mem-
bers of the House Appropriations Committee and roughly 3% to each sub-
committee. We see, however, that members of the Appropriations Committee 
obtained nearly 35% of all earmark dollars, more than twice what we would 
expect given a proportional allocation. There is a similar, if not starker, pat-
tern for subcommittee members. In terms of the different subcommittees, 
members with a seat at the appropriations table got more than half of the ear-
mark dollars for the Homeland Security subcommittee and just less than half 
for the Agriculture subcommittee. For the subcommittee with the most ear-
marks to go around (Defense), members of the Appropriations Committee 
took nearly 40% of the total, just less than US$2.5 billion. The only committee 
where appropriators received less than expected is Financial Services where 
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Figure 2. Variation in member receipt of earmarks by subcommittee.
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they garnered only 14%.16 Taken as a whole, then, this figure provides evi-
dence that committees dominate the earmark process consistent with a dis-
tributive perspective on legislative organization and supports Hypothesis 1.
Figure 4 breaks down the amount of earmark dollars by party and subcom-
mittee and provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3. As expected, the 
majority party Democrats, despite controlling only 53.6% of the seats in the 
110th House, took just more than 60% of the earmark dollars, leaving the rest 
for the minority Republicans. Compared with our other figures, there is less 
variation across subcommittees, suggesting an accepted norm of sharing ear-
marks at this ratio for each subcommittee. As we noted earlier, we need to be 
cautious in generalizing here because our data do not include a change in 
majority control. Nevertheless, the majority party advantage is consistent 
with remarks by members of Congress and previous work both in the House 
(Balla et al., 2002) and the Senate (Crespin & Finocchiaro, 2008). By giving 
a respectable share of earmarks to the minority party, Balla et al. (2002) argue 
that the majority party avoids the public backlash that might arise from uni-
laterally spending money on local rather than national needs. Moreover, the 
results support the argument made by scholars that the legislative process 
brings added benefits to majority party members (see, for example, Cox & 
Magar, 1999).
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Agriculture
Note: Subcommittee members are 3% of chamber. Full committee members 15%
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Figure 3. Percent of earmark dollars by committee membership status.
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Finally, in Figure 5 we report the average amount of earmark dollars at the 
member level, conditional on the competitiveness of the previous election. 
Democrats and Republicans are plotted separately. Here, and in the regres-
sion analysis that follows, we call a district marginal if a member received 
less than 60% of the vote. If earmarks represent a way for members to increase 
their chances for reelection, we would expect those from more competitive 
districts to receive more earmark dollars, on average, than their colleagues. 
Contrary to this perceived wisdom (and Hypothesis 4), this figure and our 
regression analyses at the subcommittee level fail to show that members from 
marginal districts consistently received more earmark dollars compared with 
safe members. For example, Figure 5 indicates that marginal Republican 
members earned more from one committee, Labor-Health and Human 
Services-Ed. (hereafter Labor-HHS-Ed.), but less from two others 
(Agriculture and Defense). Democrats from marginal districts received sig-
nificantly more in Military Construction earmarks, yet they found themselves 
with less from the Commerce-Justice-State bill (hereafter CJS). There are 
two possible reasons why we might uncover this result. First, prior research 
has found Republicans tend not to benefit from this type of federal spending 
so the largely null result here should not be too surprising (Alvarez & Saving, 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
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Interior
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Com-Just-State
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Figure 4. Percent of earmark dollars by party and subcommittee.
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1997; Crespin & Finocchiaro, 2013; Lazarus & Reilly, 2010; Sellers, 1997). 
Second, although the majority leadership has a strong incentive to maintain 
its majority and the power that goes along with it, cardinals and ranking 
members tend to be powerful independent of majority status. This means that 
they may have other goals and choose to hand out earmarks in ways that are 
not always consistent with leadership goals. This implies a tension between 
the two foci of power within the chamber. Although the recent House ear-
mark ban helps to project an image of fiscal responsibility, it has also stripped 
power away from the Appropriations Committee and centralized it within the 
party leadership. Of course, one should be wary of drawing too much from 
this figure because it does not account for any potentially confounding 
factors.
Nonetheless, the descriptive statistics highlighted in these figures provide 
preliminary evidence in favor of distributive theories that committee mem-
bers dominate the earmark process by taking a greater share of earmark dol-
lars. We do not see that members from marginal districts are consistently 
receiving extra earmarks to bolster their reelection chances. Together, these 
results suggest that institutional positions such as serving on the Appropriations 
Committee or being in the majority party trump electoral concerns. To 
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Figure 5. Average value of earmarks by district competitiveness.
*p < .05 (two-tailed).
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examine these factors together, we next use OLS regression to control for 
various factors that might also be influencing the outcome.
In Table 1, we examine pooled earmarks and test for the influence of the 
variables described above. In Tables 2 and 3, we investigate whether the 
results are consistent when we examine the earmarks for each of the subcom-
mittees across the two parties. Because our understanding of the earmark 
process suggests that the cardinals and ranking members run the subcommit-
tees with a degree of autonomy from external actors, the second set of results 
Table 1. OLS Regression of Earmark Receipts—Total and by Party.
Variables All earmarks Democratic Republican
Chair 0.697* 0.697* —
(0.229) (0.223)  
Ranking member 2.287* — 2.155*
(0.094) (0.136)
Cardinal 1.122* 1.116* —
(0.228) (0.219)  
Sub. ranking member 1.603* — 1.616*
(0.180) (0.173)
Appropriations member 0.925* 0.870* 1.053*
(0.090) (0.119) (0.123)
Leadership 1.360* 1.319* 1.498*
(0.223) (0.311) (0.076)
Seniority 0.023* 0.027* 0.025
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Marginal district 0.230* 0.387* 0.094
(0.073) (0.088) (0.106)
Demand 0.003 −0.004 0.012*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Democrat 0.333* — —
(0.068)  
Year (2008) 0.119* 0.067 0.177*
(0.037) (0.036) (0.069)
Constant 15.720* 16.046* 15.739*
(0.086) (0.092) (0.115)
n 818 465 353
R2 .296 .268 .319
Note. Standard errors clustered on member. Dependent variable is the log of total earmarks 
in US$10,000s. OLS = ordinary least squares.
*p < .05 (two-tailed).
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should more accurately reflect actual variation across different members or 
districts, especially when compared with previous research. For each set of 
regressions, the unit of analysis is the member-fiscal year, so members can 
appear in the dataset twice if they received earmarks in both fiscal years. We 
cluster the standard errors on individual members to control for possible 
dependence.
For the regressions pooling all earmarks in Table 1, the results are largely 
as we expected. Because the dependent variable is the natural log of pork 
dollars, we exponentiate the coefficient to determine the percentage change 
in earmark dollars for a one-unit change in a particular independent variable. 
This means, for instance, that a member with one additional term of seniority 
receives 2.3% more in earmark funds. David Obey, the chair of the full 
Appropriations Committee, took home 101% more as the chair and then an 
additional 207% due to his status as a cardinal (in this case, of Labor-
HHS-Ed).17 The ranking member of the full committee, Jerry Lewis, was 
perhaps the biggest winner, taking 892% more than a rank-and-file member. 
The results also indicate significant returns for subcommittee ranking mem-
bers (402%), appropriators who are not cardinals or ranking members 
(152%), and members in the chamber leadership (291%).
In this pooled model, members from marginal districts earned more ear-
mark dollars than members from less competitive districts. This result is 
somewhat surprising given the previous results from Figure 5, but it squares 
with conventional wisdom about electioneering and pork (Stein & Bickers, 
1995), as well as the findings of Lazarus (2009) and Engstrom and Vanberg 
(2010) with respect to earmarks specifically. However, the increase of just 
26.1% is small compared with the coefficients on the institutional variables. 
Marginal district is a dichotomous variable in our model that indicates 
whether the member’s previous vote share was less than 60%. To explore the 
robustness of this measure, we employed two other cutoffs, at 55% and 65%. 
These results are reported in Appendix B of the Supporting Information 
(https://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/finocchi). None of the key variables 
changed in sign or significance, and the coefficients as a whole were affected 
very little. Notably, the coefficient on marginal district barely changed at all. 
Returning to the main results, in terms of demand, we find that districts with 
more “need” for earmarks were no more likely to get them. Finally, as 
expected, Democrats obtained 40% more earmark dollars compared with 
members of the minority party. This first look at the regression results under-
scores the significant impact of the institutional variables and comports with 
distributive theory. However, the significant coefficient on the party variable 
with the majority party taking more supports partisan theories, albeit with an 
effect that is small even compared with just serving on the Appropriations 
Committee.
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When we compare the results across parties, we find some similarities and 
some important differences. For example, members in the chamber leader-
ship for both parties earned roughly the same increase in earmark dollars. 
This result should not be too much of a surprise as the committee has some 
incentive to adhere to requests from the leadership. Although we argue above 
that the committee operates with a great deal of autonomy from party leader-
ship (Adler, 2000), the independence can be reined in as power is centralized 
away from the committees. In fact, we see the recent earmark ban as just such 
an example. It appears that the committee is not as desirable as it was in the 
past with former members under ethics investigations and some arguing the 
committee is under assault on the Hill and from voters.18
We also continue to find evidence that the full committee chair and rank-
ing member, cardinals and subcommittee ranking members, and ordinary 
appropriators all received increased earmarks compared with others. Yet, the 
percentages are not the same across the two parties, with Republican appro-
priators taking a somewhat higher percentage than their Democratic counter-
parts. This might reflect sorting as Republican high demanders make their 
way to the Appropriations Committee while there are more Democratic 
demanders without seats at the table. The results also indicate that added 
seniority aids Democrats but not Republicans in receiving more earmark 
funding.
Turning to electoral concerns, the results show that the Democrats allo-
cated 47.4% more earmarks to members from marginal districts whereas the 
Republicans do not appear to have assisted vulnerable members in this way. 
Although we cannot tell if this is a Democratic effect or a majority party 
effect, it seems unlikely that the Democrats would change this pattern of 
earmark allocation if they were in the minority. Also, our interviews suggest 
that the party contingents on the Appropriations Committee allocate their 
share of earmark dollars independently of one another, so it is not likely the 
case that Democrats were preventing Republicans from using pork for elec-
toral reasons. Finally, the demand variable is not significant in the Democratic 
model although it is for the Republicans.
In the next phase of our analyses, we deal more directly with the subcom-
mittee-level focus of our theoretical argument. Because we believe that sub-
committees are responsible for the data-generating process, and coefficients 
should therefore be estimated to reflect the conditions that prevail in each 
subcommittee, we estimate regressions for each subcommittee separately by 
party. The variables in each of the models are constructed similarly to those 
in the models for total earmarks with the exception of the Demand variable, 
which is now specific to the individual subcommittee, and the Appropriations 
variable, which indicates membership on the full committee but not the rel-
evant subcommittee.
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To better compare the results across the 20 regressions, Figure 6 graphs 
the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for each of the subcommittee 
estimates by party. To summarize the essence of our findings, we see that the 
key variables related to institutional standing—leadership and membership 
on the relevant subcommittee, holding a seat on Appropriations, and party 
leadership status—frequently produce a larger percentage of pork. Seniority 
occasionally is significant but the effect is not large. Interestingly, marginal-
ity more often than not fails to obtain statistical significance at conventional 
levels and when it does, the effect is muted compared with the key institu-
tional variables. Demand is an important factor for the Agriculture and 
Figure 6. Summary of subcommittee OLS regression coefficients by party.
Note. Circles indicate the coefficient estimates and vertical lines depict the 95% confidence 
intervals. OLS = ordinary least squares.
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Military Construction subcommittees for both parties, as it is for Defense but 
only among Democrats. This finding is consistent with the long-standing 
view of these policy areas as populated with “high demanders.” Yet demand 
appears to have made very little difference in terms of the dollar amount of 
earmarks secured for either Democrats or Republicans for the rest of the 
subcommittees.
Tables 2 and 3 present the detailed results for each of the models and allow 
us to go into more detail on the substantive impact of institutional versus 
other variables. Looking across the rows in Table 2 for Democrats, we find 
that David Obey secured an extra share of earmark dollars from Energy and 
Water, Labor-HHS-Education, Interior, and Transportation while collecting 
significantly fewer earmarks from CJS. The results also indicate that cardi-
nals reaped extra earmark dollars from each of the subcommittees they 
chaired. John Murtha, dubbed the “King of Pork” by the New York Times 
(The Pork King Keeps His Crown, 2008), fared quite well, taking 2,178% 
more dollars in Defense earmarks from the subcommittee with the most ear-
mark dollars. Energy and Water Cardinal Pete Visclosky took home a slightly 
larger share, at 2,418%, although it came from a smaller pool of money.
As expected, members who served on the individual subcommittees 
obtained more earmarks than those not on the subcommittees in all but one 
case, Homeland Security. Democratic members of the full committee earned 
more earmark dollars in just three cases—CJS, Defense, and Transportation. 
The results also indicate that the leadership took an additional helping of 
earmark dollars from nine of the subcommittees. Finally, the demand variable 
is significant in the expected direction for only three subcommittees. The lack 
of more consistently significant relationships may be a function of the fact 
that constituency demand is, at least to some degree, encapsulated in subcom-
mittee membership because high demanders are more likely to find them-
selves on the relevant committees than those who are uninterested (Adler, 
2000; Adler & Lapinski, 1997).
One result that is different in contrast to the pooled model involves the 
marginal district variable. Here we see that among Democrats, the electoral 
concerns of members exhibited a positive effect on the procurement of pork 
on just the Defense and Transportation subcommittees, two of the classic 
constituency-oriented subcommittees. Moreover, electoral marginality is 
negative and significant for the Homeland Security subcommittee, suggest-
ing that the impact of this variable is severely limited in its scope. As in the 
pooled model, we examined the robustness of these results using two differ-
ent cutoffs to determine when a district is considered to be marginal. These 
resulting coefficients for the marginal district variable for all 20 models are 
shown in Table B2 of the Supporting Information (https://thedata.harvard.
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edu/dvn/dv/finocchi). These robustness tests actually reduce the number of 
cases where the marginal district variable is significant—it reaches the con-
ventional level of significance in just 3 of the 20 models if a 55% vote share 
cutoff is used, and only 2 of the 20 models if a 65% vote share cutoff is 
used.
We turn next to the results for the Republican Party, which appear in Table 
3. Here, we see that, similar to his majority party counterpart, full committee 
ranking member Jerry Lewis took extra earmarks from a few subcommit-
tees—Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation—but less from CJS. 
Subcommittee ranking members also received extra earmarks from their 
respective panels in every instance, whereas representatives serving on the 
individual subcommittees obtained more earmark dollars in 8 of 10 cases. We 
also see here that members of the full committee obtained extra earmarks 
from half of the subcommittees. When they took pork, leadership got more at 
the subcommittee level with the exception of Agriculture and Energy and 
Water. For the three instances in which members in the leadership procured 
no earmarks, we believe they simply did not ask because it seems unlikely 
that the ranking members of Financial Services, Homeland Security, or 
Military Construction would deny the party leaders earmark requests. We 
also find that more senior members obtained additional earmarks from the 
CJS, Defense, and Military Construction subcommittees.
Although the marginality of Republican members’ districts did not exhibit 
a statistically significant effect in the pooled model, our investigation at the 
subcommittee level reveals that on the CJS, Defense, and Labor-HHS panels, 
vulnerable members received a disproportionate share of pork. Yet again the 
effects are small compared with serving on the subcommittees. In just three 
instances—Agriculture, Labor-HHS, and Military Construction—the demand 
variable is positive and significant.
Taken together, these regression results reveal that the most consistent 
effects reside with the institutional variables. Members with a significant 
hand in the appropriations process in Congress—from the chair of the full 
committee to subcommittee cardinals and ranking members down to rank-
and-file appropriators—are the ones who dominate the process. In addition, 
the subcommittees do not operate in an identical fashion, as we observe vari-
ation in the size of significant coefficients and a lack of significance in other 
cases. In light of our expectation that the process is one that plays out at the 
subcommittee level, these findings should not be surprising, yet it stands in 
contrast to the approach taken in many studies of earmarks. We also show 
differences between Democrats and Republicans, again to be expected 
because the two parties for the most part operate independently when dis-
pensing earmarks to their members.
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These results largely support a distributive politics model of the earmark-
ing process. The descriptives verify that nearly all members receive some 
pork (supporting Hypothesis 2), with the few holdouts likely comprising rep-
resentatives facing unusual electoral circumstances and/or articulating out-
spoken positions against the pork barrel. Institutional factors related to 
committee and subcommittee duties are critical to understanding how pork is 
distributed and our evidence supports Hypothesis 1. Nonetheless, there is 
some support for the idea that partisan concerns play a role in determining 
earmark awards. The majority party tends to receive a share of earmarks that 
is higher than its seat share would predict, in line with Hypothesis 3. However, 
only a few subcommittees appear to be sensitive to the needs of party mem-
bers in marginal districts, thus there is much less evidence in favor of 
Hypothesis 4. Of course, we need to once again acknowledge our limited data 
timeframe and the lack of variation in majority status.
Discussion
In this article, we have assessed earmark allocation in the House of 
Representatives by parsing the effects of various factors linked to leading 
theories of legislative politics. We argue and demonstrate that members who 
control the supply of earmarks—that is, the Appropriations Committee chair 
and ranking member, subcommittee cardinals and ranking members, and 
rank-and-file members of the full committee or subcommittee—usually 
receive a larger share of the earmark pool. In addition, we highlight the sig-
nificant variation across the parties and subcommittees in the rate at which 
members receive earmarks.
We then go one step further and show that although there are many simi-
larities, Democrats and Republicans do not always allocate earmarks in iden-
tical ways. Nor do subcommittees operate identically, as Fenno (1966) 
pointed out a generation ago. Rather, our separate analyses for each subcom-
mittee demonstrate that the earmark process is not as neat and tidy as pooled 
models indicate. For example, we fail to find consistent evidence at the sub-
committee level that members of either party who are electorally vulnerable 
receive extra money for projects in their districts. This suggests a more 
nuanced relationship between marginality and earmarks that does not become 
apparent when examined with pooled data. In some ways, the results from the 
subcommittee models are unsatisfying because they call into question some 
of the generalizations that we can draw from pooled models. However, our 
reading of journalistic accounts, observations of the appropriations process, 
and discussions with staff indicate that this level of analysis is appropriate for 
understanding the allocation of earmarks because it more closely resembles 
the actual data-generating process (Morton, 1999).
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As a whole, the results seem largely to support the distributive politics 
perspective of legislative organization because it is the institutional variables 
that have the largest influence and are quite consistent in their effect. In some 
ways, this should not be surprising because we are, after all, describing and 
modeling a process that the theories were designed to explain. Nonetheless, 
in recent years, scholars have tended to use earmarks and other aspects of 
distributive politics to try and test competing theories of legislative politics 
more broadly. We show here that the majority party does have an advantage 
in the system because the overall split favors those in the majority. Nonetheless 
this is only a small part of the story. We can make a similar point about the 
electoral-based story as it only provides limited traction. Yes, in certain cases 
and in certain subcommittees, members from electorally vulnerable districts 
get a bit more, but the advantage pales in comparison with that enjoyed even 
by rank-and-file appropriators. If the party leadership was concerned solely 
with helping members get reelected, we would expect to find a more pro-
nounced effect, especially within the majority Democratic Party. Of course, 
given the limited data that are available, it is difficult to extrapolate beyond 
this single Congress, and if the impact of particular variables has changed 
over a broader period of time (e.g., the strength of parties), then our analysis 
cannot detect such changes.
Beyond the earmarks, this research tells us that the House is not a mono-
lithic chamber where the Speaker and leadership control every aspect of leg-
islation. Rather, there are (or were) a few pockets of independent power left 
in the chamber tied to the power of the purse. In the current age of budget 
tightening and limitations on earmarks, this power has declined and members 
may be less likely to pursue representative agendas that center around send-
ing federal largesse back home. Although this means a transfer of power 
away from the Appropriations Committee and toward the leadership, it might 
also put more power in the hands of the executive who can control other 
aspects of federal spending (Berry et al., 2010).
Moving forward, when examining distributive politics in Congress, schol-
ars need to be sensitive to both the underlying mechanisms and the level of 
analysis when aggregating data that are generated by a more atomistic pro-
cess. This is true even though the House’s Republican majority has effec-
tively banned earmarks in spending bills since 2011. If we were to delve into 
non-earmark appropriations, for instance, it is very likely we would find par-
allel differences across parties and subcommittees. In the present world of 
heightened polarization, it seems doubtful that the House will return to a 
full-fledged model of subcommittee government any time soon, yet it still 
seems to be the case that subcommittees are an important component of one 
of the key constitutional functions that the Congress is charged to perform—
exercising the power of the purse.
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Notes
 1. We refer the reader to Cox and McCubbins (2005) for a more thorough review of 
the congressional organization literature. For criticism of partisan theories, see, 
for example, Krehbiel (1999), and for discussion of the interplay between posi-
tive and negative agenda control in partisan theories, see Finocchiaro and Rohde 
(2008).
 2. The variation in practice between subcommittees is also evident in the observa-
tion of Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams, and Hanson (2009) that, although most 
panels insert the bulk of their earmarks at the subcommittee stage, Labor/HHS 
has a tradition of inserting earmarks at the conference committee stage.
 3. Interview conducted via email December 19, 2009. The majority party staffer 
worked in the same office during times of both majority and minority status and 
now handles all appropriations requests for the office.
 4. Interview conducted by telephone February 5, 2010.
 5. Shepsle et al. (2009) note in their study of the Senate that they estimated but did 
not report models controlling for subcommittee status, stating in summary that 
“agenda setters receive substantially more appropriations in their chamber than 
others” (p. 356). They attribute this effect, at least in part, to the fact that such 
privileged positions are likely to be a “posttreatment” effect of the electoral cycle 
effect that they propose. That is, they believe vulnerable members in cycle are 
placed on relevant subcommittees or given cardinal status.
 6. Source: Citizens Against Government Waste: http://cagw.org/content/pig-
book-2009 (last accessed Jan. 31, 2014).
 7. We do not include State/Foreign Operations or the Legislative Branch bills 
because they saw very little in the way of earmarks. Rather than use existing 
preprocessed data from Citizens Against Government Waste or Taxpayers for 
Common Sense, we collected the data ourselves directly from the relevant sec-
tions of the appropriations bills and conference reports. The data were collected 
from the conference reports for each appropriations bill. For fiscal year 2009, 
two omnibus bills were passed (H.R. 2638 and H.R. 1105) with earmarks that 
were listed by legislator in the conference reports, which are available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-110HPRT44807/content-detail.html and http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT47494/content-detail.html. The confer-
ence report for the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008 (H.R. 
2764) can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-110HPRT39564/
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content-detail.html. Committee reports for stand-alone legislation, as well as a 
number of other details on the appropriations process, are available from the 
Library of Congress: http://thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/index.html. To compile 
our data, each earmark was copied directly from a list in the conference report 
and the text was then cleaned and earmarks assigned to legislators using a simple 
Python script. Collecting the data ourselves allows us to split multi-member ear-
marks between the legislators who receive them instead of giving each legislator 
full credit for these shared earmarks, as Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS) 
does. Despite this decision, the correlation between our data for 2008 and TCS’s 
single-member 2008 data is .90.
 8. For appropriations legislation spanning fiscal years 2008 and 2009, nearly every 
measure was eventually passed as part of an omnibus appropriation (the only 
exceptions were the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations bill, which passed on its 
own, and the Labor-HHS-Education bill, which was vetoed by the President and 
later rolled into the consolidated measure). The 2008 legislation was also some-
what unique in that many of the earmarks, while subject to stricter rules about 
transparency, were not revealed until late in the appropriations cycle (Spruiell, 
2007). Despite the delay in advancing the legislation and producing the list of 
earmarks, the omnibus measure still contained nearly 9,000 earmarks (Hulse, 
2007; Williamson, 2007).
 9. Because the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, this transformation elimi-
nates members who did not receive any earmarks. This leaves us with the choice 
of either dropping these members or including them by coding them as receiving 
some small positive value such that the natural log of that value is no longer 
undefined. Given the large pot of earmarks distributed, we believe that most 
members who did not receive any earmarks failed to ask, rather than asked and 
did not receive, and that for this reason omitting them is the most appropriate 
strategy. Moreover, for this reason, we do not believe Tobit to be the appropri-
ate estimator. To demonstrate the robustness of this decision, Appendix B of the 
Supporting Information includes the results of Heckman selection models that 
include these zeros. Interestingly, there is very little change in the impact of the 
demand variable across the subcommittees for the outcome equation (amount 
of earmarks received) and the key substantive findings are not affected signifi-
cantly. The Supporting Information also includes a set of results mirroring those 
above but applying the Tobit model. Our results do not appear to be an artifact of 
specific estimation choices. The Supporting Information file is posted at https://
thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/finocchi.
10. On this point, see Crespin and Finocchiaro (2013) for a more nuanced empirical 
analysis of the endogeneity problem. For an illustrative discussion of the flurry 
of last-minute activity surrounding the submission of earmark requests at the 
committee-defined deadlines, see Pergram (2009).
11. Congressional directories are available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cdirectory/ 
(last accessed January 11, 2014).
12. We thank Gary Jacobson, as always, for supplying his data on election results.
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13. Nevertheless, we examined alternative constructions of this variable—using dif-
ferent thresholds of marginal seats, as well as an ordinal variable—and none 
affected the substantive results (results reported in Appendix B of the Supporting 
Information). In addition, we explored the possibility that seniority and competi-
tiveness might have an impact in a more nuanced fashion by using an interaction 
term. The substantive results were unchanged and this interaction was only sig-
nificant in two of the subcommittees by party models (in one case it was negative 
and in one case it was positive). We appreciate the comments of the anonymous 
reviewers on this issue, one of whom rightly notes that even a null result for this 
interaction is an interesting finding. As we discuss later in the article, this may be 
tied up in the changing nature of the appropriations process in Congress.
14. Although studies of earmarks have accounted for district demand to a limited 
extent—for instance Lee’s (2003) study of transportation earmarks incorporates 
transportation-related measures and Lazarus (2010) considers demand across 
federal agencies—no study of earmarks has modeled demand directly at the sub-
committee level. Another approach has been to include general measures such as 
district liberalism (Lazarus, 2009) that are unlikely to tap a district’s demand for 
the specific type of government spending encapsulated in legislation produced 
by each Appropriations subcommittee. Crespin and Rohde (2010) find that vot-
ing on appropriations is multidimensional, so standard measures of liberalism 
and conservatism may not correctly account for district demand for a particular 
type of earmark.
15. To be clear, if a member did not receive earmarks in either year, this is reflected 
in two observations.
16. A large share of earmark dollars for this subcommittee is allocated to presidential 
libraries.
17. David Obey is the only member in our dataset who served in multiple positions 
as both full chair and cardinal.
18. See, for example, Feehery (2010) and Sanchez and Lesniewski (2012), for a 
portrayal of the current role of the Appropriations Committees in Congress.
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